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THE CRITIC OF ARGUMENTS.
BY CHARLES S. PEIRCE.
II. THE READER IS INTRODUCED TO RELATIVES.
There is a melancholy book entitled "Astronomy
Without Mathematics." The author, an F. R. A. S.,
presumably knew something of astronomy ; therefore,
I pity him. I think I hear his groans and maledic-
tions, as he wrote the book, over the initial lie to which
he had committed himself, that it is possible to convey
any idea of the science of astronomy without making
use of mathematics. He could tell roughly how the
planets go round the sun, and make his readers think
they knew what the error of the ancient system was
(namely, that all went round the earth,—really, no er-
ror), and could set down surprising figures about the
stars (beaten, however, by Buddhistic numbers both in
magnitude and in intellectual value). A book so made
might well have been called "The Story of the Heav-
ens" (in anticipation of Dr. Ball's splendid volume,
which, promising little, performs much), but it was not
the "astronomy" stipulated for in the title page. When,
in a neighbor's house yesterday, my eye lit upon that
book, I shuddered. For I too have engaged myself by
the title of these papers to produce something of solid
value to my readers ; but, thank God, I have not agreed
to do it without the use of mathematics. I came home
and pondered ; and have decided that, in order to ful-
fil legitimate expectations, I must begin with a few
chapters upon certain dry and somewhat technical mat-
ters that underlie the more interesting questions con-
cerning reasoning. Do not fear a repetition of matter
to be found in common text-books. I shall suppose
the reader to be acquainted with what is contained in
Dr. Watts's "Logick," a book very cheap and easily
procured, and far superior to the treatises now used
in colleges, being the production of a man distin-
guished for good sense. I mean to bring out a reprint
of it, with extensive annotations, whenever I can find
an eligible publisher. Though a life-long student of
reasonings, I know no way of giving the reader the
benefit of what I ought to have learned, without ask-
ing him to go through with some irksome preliminary
thinking about relations.
For this subject, although always recognised as an
integral part of logic, has been left untouched on ac-
count of its intricacy. It is as though a geographer,
finding the whole United States, its topography, its
population, its industries, etc., too vast for convenient
treatment, were to content himself with a description
of Nantucket. This comparison hardly, if at all, ex-
aggerates the inadequacy of a theory of reasoning that
takes no account of relative terms.
A relation is a fact about a number of things. Thus
the fact that a locomotive blows off steam constitutes
a relation, or more accurately a relationship (the Cen-
tury Dictionary, under relation, 3, gives the termin-
ology. See also relativity, etc.) between the locomo-
tive and the steam. In reality, every fact is a relation.
Thus, that an object is blue consists of the peculiar
regular action of that object on human eyes. This is
what should be understood by the " relativity of knowl-
edge." Not only is every fact really a relation, but
your thought of the fact implicitly represents it as such.
Thus, when you think "this is blue," the demonstra-
tive "this" shows you are thinking of something just
brought up to your notice ; while the adjective shows
that you recognise a familiar idea as applicable to it.
Thus, your thought, when explicated, develops into
the thought of a fact concerning this thing and con-
cerning the character of blueness. Still, it must be
admitted that, antecedently to the unwrapping of your
thought, you were not actually thinking of blueness as
a distinct object, and therefore were not thinking of
the relation as a relation.* There is an aspect of every
relation under which it does not appear as a relation.
Thus, the blowing off of steam by a locomotive maybe
regarded as merely an action of the locomotive, the
steam not being conceived to be a thing distinct from
the engine. This aspect we enphrase in saying, "the
engine blows."
Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded
as referring to a single thing or to more is a question
of the form of proposition under which it suits our pur-
pose to state the fact. Consider any argument con-
• In this connection, see James's, Principles 0/Pyschology, Vol. i, pp. 237-
271 : Briefer Course, pp. 160 et seqq. James is no logician, but it is not difficult
to trace a connection between the points he makes and the theory of inference.
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cerning the validity of which a person might conceiv-
ably entertain for a moment some doubt. For instance,
let the premise be that from either of two provinces of
a certain kingdom it is possible to proceed to any prov-
ince by floating down the only river the kingdom con-
tains, combined with a land-journey within the boun-
daries of one province ; and let the conclusion be that
the river, after touching every province in the king-
dom, must again meet the one which it first left. Now,
in order to show that this inference is (or that it is not)
absolutely necessary, it is requisite to have something
analogous to a diagram with different series of parts,
the parts of each series being evidently related as those
provinces are said to be, while in the different series
something corresponding to the course of the river has
all the essential variations possible ; and this diagram
must be so contrived that it is easy to examine it and
find out whether the course of the river is in truth in
every case such as is here proposed to be inferred.
Such a diagram has got to be either auditory or visual,
the parts being separated in the one case in time, in
the other in space. But in order completely to exhibit
the analogue of the conditions of the argument under
examination, it will be necessary to use signs or sym-
bols repeated in different places and in different juxta-
positions, these signs being subject to certain "rules,"
that is, certain general relations associated with them
by the mind. Such a method of forming a diagram is
called algebra. All speech is but such an algebra, the
repeated signs being the words, which have relations
by virtue of the meanings associated with them. What
is commonly called logical algebra differs from other
formal logic only in using the same formal method with
greater freedom. I may mention that unpublished
studies have shown me that a far more powerful method
of diagrammatisation than algebra is possible, being
an extension at once of algebra and of Clifford's method
of graphs ; but I am not in a situation to draw up a
statement of my researches.
Diagrams and diagrammatoidal figures are intended
to be applied to the better understanding of states of
things, whether experienced or read of or imagined.
Such a figure cannot, however, show what it is to which
it is intended to be applied ; nor can any other diagram
avail for that purpose. The where and the when of
the particular experience, or the occasion or other
identifying circumstance of the particular fiction to
which the diagram is to be applied, are things not
capable of being diagrammatically exhibited. Describe
and describe and describe, and you never can describe
a date, a position, or any homaloidal quantity. You
may object that a map is a diagram showing localities
;
undoubtedly, but not until the law of the projection is
understood, nor even then unless at least two points
on the map are somehow previously identified with
points in nature. Now, how is any diagram ever to
perform that identification ? If a diagram cannot do it,
algebra cannot : for algebra is but a sort of diagram ;
and if algebra cannot do it, language cannot : for lan-
guage is but a kind of algebra. It would, certainly,
in one sense be extravagant to say that we can never
tell what we are talking about ; yet, in another sense,
it is quite true. The meanings of words ordinarily
depend upon our tendencies to weld together qualities
and our aptitudes to see resemblances, or, to use the
received phrase, upon associations by similarity; while
experience is bound together, and only recognisable,
by forces acting upon us, or, to use an even worse
chosen technical term, by means of associations by
contiguity. Two men meet on a country road. One
says to the other, "that house is on fire." "What
house?" "Why, the house about a mile to m}' right."
Let this speech be taken down and shown to anybody
in the neighboring village, and it will appear that the
language by itself does not fix the house. But the per-
son addressed sees where the speaker is standing, rec-
ognises his right hand side, (a word having a most sin-
gular mode of signification,) estimates a mile, (a length
having no geometrical properties different from other
lengths,) and looking there, sees a house. It is not
the language alone, with its mere associations of simi-
larity, but the language taken in connection with the
auditor's own experiential associations of contiguity,
which determines for him what house is meant. It is
requisite then, in order to show what we are talking or
writing about, to put the hearer's or reader's mind into
real, active connection with the concatenation of expe-
rience or of fiction with which we are dealing, and,
further, to draw his attention to, and identify, a certain
number of particular points in such concatenation. If
there be a reader who cannot understand my writings,
let me tell him that no straining of his mind will help
him : his whole difficulty is that he has no personal
experience of the world of problems of which I am
talking, and he might as well close the book until such
experience comes. That the diagrammatisation is one
thing and the application of the diagram quite another,
is recognised obscurely in the structure of such lan-
guages as I am acquainted with, which distinguish the
subjects and predicates of propositions. The subjects
are the indications of the things spoken of, the predi-
cates words that assert, question, or command what-
ever is intended. Only, the shallowness of syntax is
manifest in its failing to recognise the impotence of
mere words, and especially of common nouns, to ful-
fil the function of a grammatical subject. Words like
this, that, lo, hallo, hi there, have a direct, forceful ac-
tion upon the nervous system, and compel the hearer
to look about him ; and so they, more than ordinary
words, contribute towards indicating what the speech
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is about. But this is a point that grammar and the
grammarians (who, if they are faithfully to mirror the
minds of the language-makers, can hardly -be scientific
analysts) are so far from seeing as to call demonstra-
tives, such as that and this, pronouns,—a literally pre-
posterous designation, for nouns may more truly be
called pro-demonstratives.
If upon a diagram we mark two or more points to
be identified at some future time with objects in na-
ture,* so as to give the diagram at that future time its
meaning ; or if in any written statement we put dashes
in place of two or more demonstratives or pro-demon-
stratives, the professedly incomplete representation
resulting may be termed a relative rhema. It differs
from a relative term only in retaining the "copula,"
or signal of assertion. If only one demonstrative or
pro-demonstrative is erased, the result is a non-relative
rhema. For example, "— buys — from — for the
price
—
," is a relative rhema; it differs in a merely
secondary way from
"
— is bought by — from — for — ,
"
from "— sells — to — for —,"
and from "— is paid by — to — for — .
"
On the other hand, "— is mortal" is a non-relative
rhema.
A rhema is somewhat closely analogous to a chem-
ical atom or radicle with unsaturated bonds. A non-
relative rhema is like a univalent radicle ; it has but
one unsaturated bond. A relative rhema is like a
multivalent radicle. The blanks of a rhema can only
be filled by terms, or, what is the same thing, by
" something which " (or the like) followed by a rhema ;
or, two can be filled together by means of "itself" or
the like. So, in chemistry, unsaturated bonds can
only be saturated by joining two of them, which will
usually, though not necessarily, belong to different rad-
icles. If two univalent radicles are united, the result
is a saturated compound. So, two non-relative rhe-
mas being joined give a complete proposition. Thus,
to join "— is mortal" and "— is a man," we have "A^
is mortal and X is a man," or some man is mortal. So
likewise, a saturated compound may result from join-
ing two bonds of a bivalent radicle;f and, in the same
way, the two blanks of a dual rhema may be joined to
make a complete proposition. Thus, "— loves
—
,"
"X loves X," or something loves itself. A univalent
radicle united to a bivalent radicle gives a univalent
radicle (as H-0-); and, in like manner, a non-relative
rhema, joined to a dual rhema, gives a non-relative
rhema. Thus, "— is mortal " joined to "— loves—
"
gives "— loves something that is mortal," which is a
* Nature, in connection with a picture, copy, or diagram, does not ne-
cessarily denote an object not fashioned by man, but merely the object repre-
sented, as something existing apart from the representation.
t Thus, CO, which appears as such a radicle in formic acid, makes of itself
a saturated compound.
non-relative rhema, since it has only one blank. Two,
or any number of bivalent radicles united, give a biva-
lent radicle (as-O O-S-O-O), and so two or more dual
rhemata give a dual rhema ; as "— loves somebody
that loves somebody that serves somebody that loves
—
." Non-relative and dual rhemata only produce
rhemata of the same kind, so long as the junctions are
by twos ; but junctions of triple rhemata (or junctions
of dual rhemata by threes), will produce all higher
orders. Thus, "— gives — to —" and "— takes —
from —," give "— gives — to somebody who takes —
from —, " a quadruple rhema. This joined to another
quadruple rhema, as "— sells — to — for — ," gives
the sextuple rhema "— gives — to somebody who
takes — from somebody who sells — to — for — .
"
Accordingly, all rhemata higher than the dual may be
considered as belonging to one and the same order
;
and we may say that all rhemata are either singular,
dual, or plural.
Such, at least, is the doctrine I have been teaching
for 25 years, and which, if deeply pondered, will be
found to enwrap an entire philosophy. Kant taught
that our fundamental conceptions are merely the in-
eluctable ideas of a system of logical forms ; nor is any
occult transcendentalism requisite to show that this is
so, and must be so. Nature only appears intelligible
so far as it appears rational, that is, so far as its pro-
cesses are seen to be like processes of thought. I must
take this for granted, for I have no space here to argue
it. It follows that if we find three distinct and irredu-
cible forms of rhemata, the ideas of these should be
the three elementary conceptions of metaphysics. That
there are three elementary forms of categories is the
conclusion of Kant, to which Hegel subscribes ; and
Kant seeks to establish this from the analysis of for-
mal logic. Unfortunately, his study of that subject
was so excessively superficial that his argument is des-
titute of the slightest value. Nevertheless, his con-
clusion is correct; for the three elements permeate not
only the truths of logic, but even to a great extent the
very errors of the profounder logicians. I shall return
to them next week. I will only mention here that the
ideas which belong to the three forms of rhemata are
firstness, secondness, thirdness; firstness, or spontane-
ity ; secondness, or dependence ; thirdness, or medi-
ation.
But Mr. A. B. Kempe, in his important memoir
on the "Theory of Mathematical Forms,"* presents
an analysis which amounts to a formidable objection
to my views. He makes diagrams of spots connected
by lines ; and it is easy to prove that every possible
system of relationship can be so represented, although
he does not perceive the evidence of this. But he
* Philosophical Transactions for 1886. No logician should fail to study this
memoir.
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shows (§ 68) that every such form can be represented
by spots indefinitely varied, some of them being con-
nected by lines, all of the same kind. He thus repre-
sents every possible relationship by a diagram consist-
ing of only livo different kinds of elements, namely,
spots and lines between pairs of spots. Having ex-
amined this analysis attentively, I am of opinion that
it is of extraordinary value. It causes me somewhat
to modify my position, but not to surrender it. For,
in the first place, it is to be remarked that Mr. Kempe's
conception depends upon considering the diagram
purely in its self-contained relations, the idea of its
representing anything being altogether left out of view ;
while my doctrine depends upon considering how the
diagram is to be connected with nature. It is not sur-
prising that the idea of thirdness, or mediation, should
be scarcely discernible when the representative char-
acter of the diagram is left out of account. In the sec-
ond place, while it is not in the least necessary that
the spots should be of different kinds, so long as each
is distinguishable* from the others, yet it is necessary
that the connections between the spots should be of
two different kinds, which, in Mr. Kempe's diagrams,
appear as lines and as the absence of lines. Thus, Mr.
Kempe has, and must have, three kinds of elements
in his diagrams, namely, one kind of spots, and two
kinds of connections of spots. In the third place, the
spots, or units, as he calls them, involve the idea of
firstness ; the two-ended lines, that of secondness ; the
attachment of lines to spots, that of mediation.
My position has been modified by the study of Mr.
Kempe's analysis. For, having a perfect algebra for
dual relations, by which, for instance, I could express
that "A is at once lover of B and servant of C," I de-
clared that this was inadequate for the expression of
plural relations ; since to say that A gives ^ to C is to
say more than that A gives something to C, and gives
to somebody B, which is given to C by somebody.
But Mr. Kempe (§ 330) virtually shows that my alge-
bra is perfectly adequate to expressing that A gives B
to C; since I can express each of the following rela-
tions :
In a certain act, D, something is given by A;
In the act, D, something is given to C \
In the act, D, to somebody is given B.
This is accomplished by adding to the universe of
concrete things the abstraction "this action." But I
remark that the diagram fails to afford any formal rep-
resentation of the manner in which this abstract idea
is derived from the concrete ideas. Yet it is precisely
in such processes that the difficulty of all difficult rea-
soning lies. We have an illustration of this in the cir-
cumstance that I was led into an error about the capa-
* I use this word in its proper sense, and nol to mean unlike, as Mr. Kempe
bility of my own algebra for want of just the idea that
process would have supplied. The process consists,
psychologically, in catching one of the transient ele-
ments of thought upon the wing and converting it into
one of the resting places of the mind. The difference
between setting down spots in a diagram to represent
recognised objects, and making new spots for the crea-
tions of logical thought, is huge. To include this last
as one of the regular operations of logical algebra is
to make an intrinsic transmutation of that algebra.
What that mutation was I had already shown before
Mr. Kempe's memoir appeared.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BUDDHISM.
BY PROF. H. H. WILLIAMS.
What was this knowledge ? It is this : Physical
life and suffering are one thing. To be born is to suf-
fer. The cause of suffering is the cause of physical
existence. And the cause of physical existence is de-
sire. Why does the soul desire ? It is through ignor-
ance. Ignorance, not knowing, is a positive thing, a
power. This can be displaced by knowledge, a posi-
tive thing, a power. Knowledge is the only thing that
will overcome ignorance. It will uproot the cause of
desire. Knowledge thus destroys the cause of phys-
ical existence. It breaks the ceaseless chain of trans-
migration. Knowledge is salvation.
From the viewpoint of Gotama, this solution was
the only one possible. For to him, the cause of the
child is not the parents. These are only incidents in
a process. The cause of the child lies in the child it-
self, in the ego, as we say. The physical form is but
one of a thousand others, and the essential child has
persisted through all these physical forms. What
then is there within the child itself that could be the
cause of its physical existence ? This was Gotama's
problem. And the deepest answer he could give was
the one he gave, viz., desire. (Desire is used in an
inclusive sense.) He reached this doctrine through
an analysis of conduct and easily identified the ground
of conduct with the ground of physical existence, be-
ing a Hindoo.
The third crisis involves the resolution to preach.
Gotama had won his own salvation. The knowledge
that brought him salvation made him Buddha. His
doctrine was won at high cost. It was not easy to be
understood. Should he preach it to men ? He de-
bated as follows: "This profound truth, I have, after
"many struggles, perceived; a truth difficult to dis-
"cern
; a truth difficult to understand ; a truth fraught
"with blessings; supreme, transcending all thought;
"a truth, teeming with meaning; one that the sage
"alone can grasp. The race of man is of the earth :
"there it moves and has its being, there is its abode.
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<'and there it finds its pleasures. And by this race,
"which is of the earth, whose abode is on the earth,
"and which finds on the earth his pleasures, this truth
"will hardly be comprehended— this law of causality,
"this law of the concatenation of causes and effects.
"And so, too, will it be difficult for it to comprehend
"the final state of peace and rest of all forms, the sur-
" render of all things earthly, the quenching of desire,
" the ceasing of wants, the termination—Nirvana. If,
"then, I announce my doctrine to the world and am
"not understood, I shall only bring upon myself ex-
"haustion and pain. . . . As the Enhghtened One thus
"reasoned, his heart was disposed to rest forever in
"peace and not to preach his doctrines."
Gotama was in the act of having life, of abandoning
men to their weary fate, of realising Nirvana at once,
when the God, Sahampati, interposed. He assured
Gotama, on bended knee, that the fate of the world was
involved in this resolution. Sahampati induced Go-
tama to preach his doctrine. Buddha began promptly
to preach the holy truth and to gather disciples about
him.
The Hindoo could see no ground in the facts them-
selves for this resolution of Buddha, therefore he as-
cribed it to the gods. But there must be a ground,
a missionary basis, in the facts. Where is it ? Why
did Buddha preach his doctrine ? What is the source
of his missionary impulse ? There seems to be noth-
ing in the fact that desire is the root of physical ex-
istence to develop a missionary. Nor was there any-
thing in the habits or traditions of Indian life to call
out such activity. In fact the ascetic is the very op-
posite of the missionary. The entire power of the
Indian habit of mind moved in the direction of the
retiring, passive life. The missionary idea is foreign
to the Indian type. The Brahmin lived and loved a
lonely life. He had no interest in any other people
than his own. Nor was his state or his family the
object of deep interest to him. He, like his people,
preferred to work out his own salvation. Notwith-
standing these facts, we find the missionary idea deep
rooted in the spirit of Buddhism. Buddhism has
lived up to this idea. It has spread, and rapidly too,
over a large part of the world. If then this idea does
not lie in the Indian type, nor in the Indian tradition,
whence came it? How did it secure and hold so deep
a place in the Buddhistic religion? This question is
not theological, it is purely psychological. An idea
makes its appearance at a given time, and makes it-
self felt in the motives of men : the birth of this idea
is a question for the psychologist. It is then the birth
of this missionary idea in the consciousness of Buddha
that we are concerned with.
No animal is a missionary. The savage is not a
missionary. The Brahmin is not a missionary. The
Buddhist is a missionary. What makes the differ-
ence ? The life of the animal is one of physical rela-
tions only. The physical relation is definite and nar-
row; There is nothing general in it. The fact that
John is born of Mrs. Smith cannot be the ground of
a kind impulse towards Mrs. Jones. And if John
leads a physical life he will be conscious of the phys-
ical relation. The physical relation is binding in a
definite direction and stops at a given point. Hence
it is that the physical life offers no missionary activ-
ity. Our problem is then to find the basis for a gen-
eral relation. Where is there anything that ap-
proaches a universal relativity ? It is in the mental
life. The relativity of knowledge, of any knowledge,
is a fact. Exhaustive knowledge at any point is a uni-
versal relation. The relation in mental life is the ex-
act opposite of the relation in physical life. Relativ-
ity is the fundamental law in the world of knowledge.
The mental process in its beginning and at its ending
is a relation ; while the physical process is a unit, a
centre that struggles for its life and survives through
its fitness. Says Professor Hoffding, "There is no
series of absolutely independent sensations, but every
sensation is determined by its relation to the one ex-
perienced immediately before it or at the same time,"
and again, (p. 114), "A sensation, which stands in no
relation to any other, is not known to us. This law
may be called the law of relativity. From the mo-
ment of its first coming into being, the existence and
properties of a sensation are determined by its rela-
tion to other sensations."* Here then in the first ap-
pearance of the mental life, viz., in sensation we find
the law of relativity. Nor does the law vanish as we
ascend the stages of the mental process. Thinking is
obviously relating. To think an object is to put it in
the widest relations. Here then is the home of the
missionary idea. What is the doctrine of brotherhood
other than an application of the law of relativity ?
When a man begins to know he begins to establish
relations. When he begins to think, he begins to es-
tablish universal relations. In the thought-world we
find universal relations, and there only. It is living
and moving in this world of thought that develops the
missionary impulse. Knowledge applied to the ex-
ternal leads us up to the idea of the universe; applied
to man it leads up to the idea of brotherhood. And
it is the universal idea that produces the universal
feeling which we term the missionary motive. Let us
see how this analysis applies to the question under
consideration. Brahmanism shows us the Hindoo in
the early stage of his work. He is intoxicated with
his discovery. He seeks knowledge everywhere. His
one desire is to possess the treasure. He is as the
man seeking a fortune ; while Buddhism is as the son
* Outlines 0/ Psychology, p. 112.
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who makes use of the fortune accumulated by his
father. Brahmanism seeks knowledge ; Buddhism ap-
plies it. Hence it is that the Buddhist is a missionary
while the Brahmin is an ascetic. In Buddhism the
fundamental law of knowledge is bearing fruit. And
Gotama is a missionary as naturally as the Brahmin
is an ascetic. It is this fact of universal relativity as-
serting itself in the mind of Buddha, that leads him
to lose himself in his relations and to spend his life
in serving mankind. This is the solution of our prob-
lem. Knowledge had been discovered and developed
by Brahmanism. Gotama entered into this inherit-
ance. He was a son of India. In his mind knowledge
had its full and free play. And the result is a new
type of man. He is a missionary, the early friend of
humanity. India has given the world two types—the
ascetic and the missionary—the man who discovers
knowledge and the man who applies it.
We have followed thus the dialectic of Buddhism
and have found it to move in a line logically straight.
If now we look at Buddhism as a whole, as a movement
in thought and life, what is it? Brahmanism gave us
the idea of the world soul, Brahma, the one that is all
;
Buddhism moves to the other extreme and makes the
individual a centre of eternal power. Buddhism is the
doctrine that the highest and largest power in the uni-
verse is Gotama become Buddha. Knowledge made
Gotama Buddha—and this knowledge is possible to
every man. Buddhism places supreme faith in the
individual. It appeals to the individual to realise his
eternal power. The individual is subject to passion,
but his glory is to conquer this. Buddhism is our
earliest setting forth of the doctrine of individualism.
Here is the secret of its large place in the minds of
men. And this is the idea it has contributed to human
thought. From the beginning Buddhism has insisted
upon the worth, dignity, and infinite possibilities of
the individual. It is this fact that gives Buddhism its
place in line with the greatest movements of history.
CURRENT TOPICS.
A dispatch from Columbus, Ohio, dated Oct. 2, reads thus
:
"The revival of knownothingism was the subject of Dr. Washing-
ton Gladden's sermon at the First Congregational church to-night.
Referring to the anti-catholic movement which is very strong here,
he denounced all such secret organisations as un-American." Dur-
ing the past few weeks I have heard fifty varieties of social and
political customs denounced as "un-American," and every one of
them was, and is, more prevalent in this country than in any other
and some of them are practices peculiar to the Americans, and act-
ually not known to any other people under the sun. In like man-
ner I find the hackneyed and conceited nickname "typical Ameri-
can " given to every American of importance who happens to be
mentally and morally unlike nine-tenths of all his countrymen.
Those titles and phrases are typical shams, bits of hypocrisy with
which we try to hide the blemishes in our customs and our char-
acter. Will Dr. Gladden kindly tell us what is "un-American" in
secret organisations ? One of the most conspicuous traits in the
American character is the disposition to join a secret society, so-
cial, religious, or political. We are very much like the schoolboy,
caught in a misdemeanor, who lays the blame of it on to Jack, or
Bill, or Tom. So it is with us. When we are detected in some
delinquency peculiarly our own, we charge it on the French, or
the English, or the Germans, or somebody else, and with self-
righteous impudence declare that we could not possibly be guilty
of it, because it is "un-American."
"Did Peary's project pay?" . This is the alliterative head-line
which I find at the top of a column of extracts from various news-
papers, measuring Lieut. Peary's expedition by a purely monetary
standard, and calling for the dividends in cash. One of them fret-
fully inquires, "What useful end will be subserved by finding out
whether or not there is an ice-bound, uninhabitable island between
Greenland and the next known shore on the other side of the
pole ?" Another says, " What boots it to ascertain how cold it may
be there ? " And another exclaims, "Artie explorations are hardly
more valuable in their results than an attempt to go over Niagara
in a barrel would be." These will do for samples of opinions that
might be multiplied by hundreds to the effect that Lieut. Peary's
expedition did not "pay." The moral results of heroism count for
nothing, because they will not sell for anything at auction; and
yet the records of unprofitable courage are among the most valu-
able treasures of a nation. It is not wise to make the fear of per-
sonal danger an element of our national character. Wherever a
scientific secret lies hidden within this earth, there are American
sailors brave enough to go and pluck it ont of Nature's heart if
possible ; and, win or lose, their self-devotion improves the quality
of their countrymen. How much of unprofitable courage lies at
the foundation of England's greatness ; and of our own ! The search
for Sir John Franklin was a failure, melancholy and expensive,
but the United States got more glory out of it than out of twenty
battles. The sublime effort of Dr. Kane to find Franklin is an epic
that dwarfs old Homer's mighty theme. The exploit of Lieut.
Peary did pay ; and that of his wife paid still better. Mrs. Peary
has taught our frivolous women that they have capacity and cour-
age of which they never dreamed.
Did Sir John Franklin's project pay ? If an Englishman should
ask that question he would be thought weak in the spirit of the old
sea-kings. Not in ease and safety, but in hardship and in danger,
did England cultivate the soul that animated Nelson, Blake, and
Franklin. So it will be with us, for the children of the old Vikings
are thick along the American shore. If any man doubts the worth
of Sir John Franklin's fatal voyage, let him gaze upon Franklin's
monument in the old abbey at Westminster, and estimate if he
can, the value of such a trophy in toughening the moral fibre of a
people. There we behold writ in marble the story of masculine
bravery and feminine domestic love, the supreme constituents in
the glory of the English race. On the top is a bust of the great
explorer, with '
' FRANKLIN " on the base of it. Below the bust is
the Erebus wrestling with the gigantic ice; and the devoted wife,
although her husband had been dead for thirty years in the cold
regions near the pole, lifting a woman's faith above her sorrow,
carved upon the monument these words: " O ye frost and cold;
O ye ice and snow ; Bless ye the Lord ; praise him and magnify
him for ever." And this fine tribute from Tennyson :
" Not here I the White North has thy bones ; and thou,
Heroic sailor soul,
Art passing on thine happier voyage now,
Towards no earthly pole."
It was fitting that when Lady Franklin died, these additional
words were carved upon the marble
:
" This monument was erected by Jane his widow, who after long waiting,
and sending many in search of him, herself departed, to seek and to find him
in the realms of light,"
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Take the record of those two lives together as it is written on
that monument for the emulation of all English men and women,
and is it any wonder that England is a coloniser and a conqueror ?
* * *
A number of years ago there was a man in London who made
his living by exhibiting in a large cage on wheels a " Happy Fam-
ily," as he called it, composed of naturally quarrelsome and un-
congenial members, such as cats and mice, terriers and rats, hawks
and canaries, rabbits and snakes, with fifty other heterogeneous
animals who had never before lived in harmony together since the
fall of Adam and Eve. All was peace in the colony, for the show-
man had brought the inhabitants under the discipline of social and
religious toleration ; although, before they were educated, they
had looked upon one another with caste prejudices and sectarian
scorn. The genius who taught the citizens of that community the
value of peace and mutual good will, was rewarded with a penny
here and there from a passer-by who admired the feat as a triumph
of patient ingenuity ; but I think it was more than that. I always
regarded it as the moral achievement of a great man, who ought
to have been Archbishop of Canterbury, at the very least, recon-
ciling the sects and making of them a "Happy Family," like the
cats and mice, the hawks and canaries in the cage. What the
Archbishop had not been able to do with rich materials, the show-
man accomplished with inferior means ; he had shown how sweet
and how pleasant it is, not only for brethren, but also for those
who are not brethren, to dwell together in unity. I am happy to
see that his example is not lost, and that an attempt will be made
next year to exhibit at the World's Fair, a theological "Happy
Family " consisting of representatives of all the different and dif-
fering sects upon the earth ; and that this congregation is to be
called "The Parliament of all Religions."
In the RcvUta of Reviews for October, much encouragement is
given to the Parliament of all Religions ; and very eloquent and
enthusiastic praise of it appears in Count D'Alviella's article printed
recently in the Revue de Belgique, Brussels, and copied into the
Review of Reviews. Already, letters in approval and promises of
co-operation have come from eminent men of all religions in every
part of the globe ; for the Parliament is to include all denomina-
tions of Christians, and also Jews, Buddhists, Brahmins, Confu-
cians, Parsees, and Mohammedans ; " not to plead the superiority
of their respective theology," says Count D'Alviella, " but to seek
and set forth the principles of all religions ; " and " to find a com-
mon ground where religion shall have a field outside of denomina-
tional divergence." I hail this promise as the Arctic wanderer
greets the rising sun ; a parliament of sects is to overthrow sec-
tarianism, and sacrifice the delightful hatreds of a thousand years.
By a strange oversight the men who long ago "set forth the prin-
ciple common to all religions," and "found a common ground for
religion outside of denominational divergence " have not been in-
vited to the Parliament. The sect that regards all other sects with
equal charity and demands equal freedom for all their faiths will
not be represented in the conference. According to Count D'Al-
viella. this Parliament is to proclaim "a religion which is the re-
ligion par exeel/enee, and which is superior to any particular reli-
gion whatsoever." This will be the most exalted and the most
effective spiritual work done since freedom went into theological
eclipse long ago ; because if there is one universal religion "supe-
rior to any particular religion whatsoever," there can be no further
use for the particular religions. The religion superior to all others
is enough, and the sects may beneficially be dissolved.
The Parliament of all Religions will abolish the crime called
heresy, because when the universal religion "superior to any par-
ticular religion" is established, heresy will ceaee to be. It will
vanish into the limbo of dead creeds, and carry away with it all
its foolish punishments. Then the churches, united in a common
faith, will see and say that he who is not a free thinker is not a
free man, and the " open and avowed " sectarian will be a curios-
ity. Ambitious men quibble and squabble about free trade, but
the supreme triumph of this age is a free brain. The president of
the Parliament of all Religions is a Presbyterian Doctor of Divin-
ity, conspicuous for his learning, character, and ability ; but before
his parliament can abolish heresy the Presbyterian Church is de-
termined to enjoy once more the luxury of trying a heretic. Charges
and specifications have been preferred against the Rev. Dr. Briggs,
for knowing more than the church ; for thinking forward, instead
of backward
; and his trial is to begin on the gth of November.
The anticipated pleasure of the prosecution is not so great as it
would be if Dr. Briggs were not quite so eager to be prosecuted.
You seldom see a delinquent so anxious to be tried as he is ; and
his pursuers already begin to feel as I did once in the backwoods
of Canada, when the bear that I was after got after me. The
friends of Dr. Briggs appear to be in a majority in the Presby-
terian church, for the paper says: "Early in the day's session
nominations for delegates to the synod which meets in Albany,-
Oct. 18, were made. The vote showed a sweeping victory for the
friends of Dr. Briggs." Should the rationalistic presbyterianism
of Dr. Briggs prove triumphant, as now seems likely, his judges
then will be the heretics, and he can have some religious consola-
tion in trying them ; for the difference between Orthodoxy and
Heterodoxy, is merely a question of numbers; Orthodoxy of course
being always in the majority.
M. M. Trumbull.
BOOK REVIEWS.
The Speech of Monkeys. By R. L. Garner. New York : Charles
L. Webster & Company. 1892.
The author of the present work is certainly to be congratulated
on originality in his design, although we question whether he is
correct in saying that " not a line on this subject is to be found in
all the literature of the world." The idea that many animals have
a language of their own is an old one, and a knowledge of the
language of birds was regarded by the ancient Greeks as a sort of
divine gift. Mr. Garner's originality consists in attributing to
monkeys especially the use of speech the same in its elements as
that of man. He may be wrong in this conclusion, but in any
case he is quite justified in drawing practical attention to the ques-
tion, after having made a series of careful investigations and ex-
periments. This he could not have done without the use of the
phonograph or graphophone, and some of the results thus reached
are very curious, whatever may be the ultimate conclusion as to
the connection between human and monkey speech. It would be
a mistake to suppose that the author believes animals to be able to
carry on with each other a connected conversation. He imagines
that ' ' the masses " are of a contrary opinion, which he corrects by
saying that the speech of monkeys is usually limited to a single
sound or remark, which is replied to in the same manner But
the real point is as to the relation of this speech to that of man;
and nothing that the author says supplies evidence that monkeys
have what is understood by articulate "language." That they
utter sounds which have a particular meaning and that this mean-
ing is understood by other monkeys, and even that they may learn
to understand the meaning of words used by human beings is cer-
tain ; but this is not language in the proper sense, although it is
speech, just as the mewing of a cat is speech. All that can be
justly inferred from Mr. Garner's observations is, in his own
words, " their speech is capable of communicating the ideas that
they are capable of conceiving, and, measured by their mental,
moral, and social status, is as well developed as the speech of man
measured by the same unit." But the author could have reached
this conclusion without ever hearing a monkey speak ; and not only
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is it what every naturalist must admit, but it applies equally well
to all animals, if the doctrine of evolution is valid.
The most important feature in Mr. Garner's work is his pro-
posal to attempt to reach the primitive elements of speech by the
use of the phonograph. His experiments with this instrument lead
him to believe that the fundamental sounds of monkey speech are
pure vowels, although faint traces of consonant sounds are found
in many words, especially those of low pitch. He has been able
also to develop certain consonant sounds from a vowel base, and
he thinks therefore that this has been the origin of the former in
human language. This view is not confirmed, however, by what
we know of the most primitive human languages, in which the
dropping of consonantal sounds is rather a mark of decay. As to
the extent of the monkey vocabulary, it appears to be somewhat
limited, as the author is able to credit his Capuchin friends with
only nine words, although some of these are supposed to be ca-
pable of several meanings by difference of inflection. This would
hardly seem, however, to be sufficient to enable little Dodo, whose
portrait is given on the cover of the book, to express the ideas
ascribed to her in her lover" s complaint, which must have been of
the most remarkable character.
The book is, on the whole, a very readable one, especially
where it describes monkey manners. It is not surprising that the
author has become sincerely attached to his simian friends, whose
ways appear to be very entertaining. He has the faculty of gain-
ing their confidence through the use of their peculiar sounds, and
we trust he will be equally successful with the gorillas of West
Africa he has gone to interview. If he could teach them his own
language as well as learn their speech, his journey would have a
practical value, which we fear, so far as the monkey race gener-
ally is concerned, his inquiries will be deficient in. Nevertheless,
he may be able to collect facts which will throw light on the bases
of human language, as it must ultimately be founded in the emo-
tions; but others must draw the conclusions, unless he learns bet-
ter than to say, "if it be true that man cannot think without
words, the same must be true of monkeys " ; which confounds
the popular with the philosophic meaning of thought. fl.
L'AuTORiTE EN matiSre de foi et la nouvelle ecole. By E.
Doiwiergue. Lausanne : F. Payot. Paris : Librairie Fisch-
bacher. 1892.
This critical study has been called into existence by the re-
ception accorded by numerous journals, and by such writers as
M. M. Coquerel, Astie, Roberty, and Raoul Allier, to a pamphlet
written by M. Leopold Monod, the well-known pastor of the free
church of Lyon, on The Problem of Authority. M. Monod's
pamphlet is accepted by the New School among the French Pro-
testants as its manifesto, and judging from the observations of M.
Doumergue, who is the professor of Protestant theology at Mon-
tauban, it must be a very able production. The Protestant church
in France has long been agitated with the same questions as those
which have disturbed the religious peace in this country and in
Great Britain, and the New School appears to have reached the
position characterised by its opponents as the "divorce between
thought and life." This position is certainly a somewhat incon-
gruous one, and it may well be questioned whether those who affirm
that "the sphere of action of Plato has been that of ideas
. .
.
; the
sphere of action of Jesus Christ has been the life," can justly claim
to retain the title of Christian, using this term in the ordinary
sense. That they lead a "Christian" life is admitted by Professor
Doumergue, who well remarks, "we are convinced that this Chris-
tianity, this piety, are with them the fruit, not of the new doctrines
that they preach, but of the ancient doctrines that they reject."
Nevertheless, many of the moral precepts ascribed to Jesus are re-
jected by the new school of Protestants in all countries, those only
being retained which are regarded as consistent with the present
advanced stage of moral culture ; and it would be better if they
recognised more clearly the fact that they have ceased to belong
to the distinctively Christian church. Professor Doumergue ad-
dresses himself, for special reasons, particularly to the younger
members of the French Protestant church, whom he regards as its
chief protectors. There is no doubt that his manual, which is
closely reasoned, will be widely read by those interested in the
question of authority in matters of faith. S2.
The Making of a Man. By Rev. J. W. Lee, D. D. New York;
Cassell Publishing Company.
This book is based on the idea that mind is prior to matter,
and that there is design, intention, and purpose in nature. The
earth was made for man, and "the scheme of nature so com-
pletely corresponds to the understanding of man as to make it
possible for him to command and claim all her possessions for his
own." The author, however, regards the earth as a place of dis-
cipline, and he points out what he considers to be the provision
made for the physical, moral, spiritual, and other phases of man's
nature, including immortality, which belongs to him as a self-de-
termining spirit ! The book is well written and is well intentioned,
but it is theological rather than scientific. fl.
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